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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
against a continuing trespass could be obtained even though the
title is in dispute if there is an action of ejectment pending or about
to be brought at law.13 If the situation is such that the court
would grant an injunction if the title were not in dispute, it seems
that an injunction should be granted if an action of ejectment is
pending where the title is in dispute.1
4
From the foregoing discussion it is easy to see that although
equity will settle title where the dispute involves merely a question
of law, and will also grant an injunction to restrain trespasses when
an enjectment action is pending or immediately to be brought at
law, equity still refuses to exercise its jurisdiction to settle a title
dispute where issues of fact for the jury are involved.
R.A.K.
JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS IN WEST VIRGINIA.-The question of
the validity of joint and mutual wills was presented before the court
in the case of Underwood v. Myers., The court, deciding against the
defendant's contention that such wills are invalid, recognized the
following principle:
"When mutual and joint wills were first considered by the
English courts, they were disapproved and the earlier Ameri-
can decisions also pronounce against them; but the more
modern views of the courts of both countries sustain the
validity of such wills and declare they are not contrary to
public policy."
2
Therefore, it is seen that the West Virginia court clearly
recognizes the validity of joint and mutual wills. With this as a
starting point it will be the intended purpose to present the legal
effect of such wills as determined from an examination of the West
Virginia cases involving joint and mutual wills. It should be
noted that this discussion will not consider the effect of attempted
revocation prior to the death of either of the makers of the will.
In order to discuss intelligently joint and mutual wills, it is
necessary that the terms be dearly defined. In West Virginia a
joint will is a testamentary instrument with reciprocal provisions
executed pursuant to an agreement or compact jointly signed by
two or more persons. Perhaps, an extract from a West Virginia
case will best illustrate:
13 See Henline v. Miller, 117 W. Va. "439, 443, 185 S.E. 852, 853 (1936).
14 Cf. West Virginia Development Co. v. Preston County Development Co.,
76 W. Va. 492, 495, 85 S.E. 668, 669 (1915).
1 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929).
2 Id. at 59, 146 S.E. at 896.
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"We hereby will and bequeath to Mary Belle Myer all of
the land . . .of which we, or either of us, may die seized or
possessed, but the said real estate ... shall not pass to the said
Mary . . .so long as either of us . . .shall live, but after the
death of the last survivor of this will the said real estate shall
pass to ... the said Mary ... in fee."
In Black's Law Dictionary,4 mutual wills are defined as "the
separate wills of two people which are reciprocal in provision.
Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N.W. 316, 321." A further
definition of mutual wills in the same authority is "Or those
executed pursuant to agreement or compact between two or more
persons to dispose of their\property in particular manner, each in
consideration of the other.' Maloney v. Rose, 224 Iowa 1071, 277
N.W. 572, 574." The West Virginia court generally refers to
mutual wills by the former definition.r
It is apparent herefrom that the term "mutual wills" may be
subject to several meanings which are clearly ambiguous. For
example, two wills may be reciprocal in provisions, and yet com-
pletely devoid of any contractual agreement or compact. As far
as can be determined, the ambiguity, although existing, has not
effected any misunderstanding in the court's decisions in West
Virginia. However, for the purpose of clear understanding, in this
note executed wills with reciprocal provisions will be referred to as
mutual wills; and if such wills were executed pursuant to an agree-
ment between the parties to dispose of their property in a particular
manner, the wills will be referred to as "mutual contractual wills."
In the Underwood case, the validity of the joint will was up-
held, and the reciprocal provisions therein were held to be prima
facie evidence of the contractual agreement between the parties.
It is therefore seen that in order to establish joint and mutual
contractual wills, it is necessary to prove a contractual agreement.
It is important to recognize that certain presumptions in establish-
ing the contractual agreement are applied by the West Virginia
court. However, in reference td these presumptions, our court
makes a distinction as to the presumption which is applicable,
depending upon whether a joint or mutual will is in controversy.
In the Underwood case, the only West Virginia case which involved
a joint will, the court held that the reciprocal provisions of the
will evidenced that the will was the result of a contractual agree-
ment between the parties. However, in the Wilson case, the court
3 Id. at 57-58, 146 S.E. at 896.
44th ed. 1951.
5 See Wilson v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S.E. 539 (1935).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss3/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
held that the making of separate wills with reciprocal provisions
was insufficient to establish the necessary contractual element; but
the court further declared that where the circumstances surround-
ing the making of separate but identical wills by husband and wife,
by the terms of which each was made the sole beneficiary of the
other, are such that all the elements of the making of a joint will
are present, the wills will be regarded as tantamount to a joint
will with their reciprocal provisions evidencing a contractual agree-
ment between the makers.
Again, it is seen that loose usage of terminology is being ap-
plied in these cases. The court speaks of separate wills which is
a requisite of mutual contractual wills. Yet, the language clearly
states: ". . if the elements of the making of a joint will are present
... ," An important element of making a joint will is that the
same instrument be signed by two or more persons. The legal
principles set forth are sound and seemingly understandable, but
the language of the court, in itself, is completely conflicting. If
the language is to be construed literally, it would be necessary, in
order to establish mutual contractual wills, to establish the ele-
ments of a joint will which hardly seems to be within the realm of
possibility.
Upon further examination of the cases, it appears that the
difference between joint and mutual wills, in addition to their
form, lies in the fact that a joint will enjoys a presumption that
the parties intended a contractual arrangement; whereas in a
mutual will, reciprocal provisions are only some evidence of a con-
tractual agreement, and surrounding circumstances, such as prep-
aration of the separate wills at the same time, and attested to by
the same witnesses, are required to show the contractual intent of
the parties.
It is interesting to compare the results of two West Virginia
cases involving mutual wills of similar nature. In the Wilson case,
the court held that the two separate wills involved were mutual
wills and sufficient to establish the contract to dispose of their
property in a particular manner. However, In the Matter of
Werkman,7 the court reached a contrary result, and held that the
mutually executed wills did not create the necessary contractual
agreement. In the former case, the surrounding circumstances
were found to be sufficient to establish the intent to enter a con-
' Pt. I of the syllabus by the court. Italics supplied.
7 122 W. Va. 583, 13 S.E.2d 73 (1940).
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tractual agreement; while as has been shown in the latter case a
contrary decision was reached.
What then was the distinguishing feature that brought about
the diverse decisions? In the Wilson case, the evidence showed that
on the same day in the presence of each other, husband and wife
executed separate but identical wills, subscribed to by the same wit-
nesses, in which each was made the sole and absolute beneficiary of
the entire estate of the other. In the Werkman case, the evidence
showed that on the same day in the presence of each other, husband
and wife executed separate wills in which each was made the sole
and absolute beneficiary of the entire estate of the other. The provi-
sions of the wills were practically identical. They were signed by
husband and wife and witnessed by the same witnesses, at the same
time, all in the presence of each other. Also, it was found that the
wills were written on the same typewriter and were placed in the
same safety deposit box under the joint names of the makers of
the wills.
It would seem that, upon the immediate facts available, there
was not any distinguishing features involved in the cases that
would justify two completely different decisions. The court in the
Werkman case attempted to distinguish the Wilson case upon the
basis that the record before them failed to show, except by infer-
ence, that the wife had any knowledge of the contents of the will
of her husband. The court further said that they could surmise
that she did have such knowledge. However, the court subse-
quently refused to say that from this inference, they could find that,
based thereon, the wife must have had such knowledge, and that
the two wills must in effect be held as joint and to come within the
holding of the Wilson case.
Certainly, if the court is to be consistent with its stated policy
of relying on presumptions in cases of this nature, it is necessary
for it to resort to evident inferences. However, in the Werkman
case, the court stated that the fundamental rule in the construction
of wills is that the intention of the testator, if not inconsistent with
some established rule of construction, must control. It is worthy
to note that in the Illinois case of Kaiser v. Cobbey,8 it was held
that contracts to make wills are not favored, and the court will be
more strict in examining into the nature of such contracts than
with other contracts. Perhaps, the court in the Werkman case
was directing its decision upon the same line as the Illinois court.
8 400 IM. 214, 79 N.E.2d 604 (1948).
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Also, in arriving at the intention of the parties, it would seem that
a more equitable result was reached by holding that the necessary
contractual agreement was not present in the Werkman case, as the
survivor of the original makers seemed to be more inclined toward
his wife's heirs than his own heirs.
If the parties desire the separate wills to serve as a contract,
it is only necessary for them to make a mere recital of this fact.
It is submitted that the parties should be explicit in expressly pro-
viding for their desired results, for if reliance is made upon the
supposed existing presumptions, their intended desires may be
wholly denied due to insufficient evidence to indicate that the wills
were made pursuant to a testamentary agreement.
Assuming now that we have joint or mutual contractual wills
with sufficient facts and surrounding circumstances to evidence a
contractual agreement between the testators, what validity is to be
given the will of the survivor? For purposes of simplicity, joint and
mutual wills shall be considered separately, in discussing what
validity, if any, will be given to the will of the survivor in West
Virginia.
The legal effect of a joint will upon the death of one of the
makers appears to be well settled in West Virginia by the Under-
wood case. In that case the court declared that when the survivor
has accepted the benefits under the will, the agreement becomes
obligatory upon him and may be enforced in equity against his
estate by a remainderman under the will. This would seem to be
in accord with the prevailing viewP
Ordinarily, it would make no difference if the survivor's will is
held to be operative or inoperative, upon the death of the pre-
deceaser. Generally, upon the death of the survivor, the issue of
the marriage would be the beneficiaries either by intestacy, if the
will is considered inoperative, or by virtue of the anti-lapse statute
in the event that the survivor's will is held to be operative. How-
ever, circumstances may arise whereby part or all of the issue of the
predeceased are of a former marriage or illegitimate children. Had
the survivor been the beneficiary of the provisions in the pre-
deceaser's will, will the court now probate the survivor's will to
pass all the property back to the predeceaser, which by operation
0 "If one of the parties to a joint or mutual will die without having
revoked it, and the survivor benefit thereby, the will may be revoked in equity,
as a compact, against revocation by the survivor, or, after the survivor's death,
the agreement is enforceable in favor of third persons whose rights he dis-
regarded by a new subsequent will." WonmER, AmucAN LAw OF A DM -'.A-
NON § 37 (3d ed. 1925).
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of the anti-lapse statute,10 gives what was formerly the predeceaser's
property, plus the property of the survivor, to the predeceaser's
issue? The court, in the case of In re Reed," by declaring the will
of the survivor inoperative, has obviated this seemingly illogical
result, that is, passing the property through the predeceaser's heirs.
Grounding their decision on the oft-mentioned contractual
agreement, the court in the Reed case declared that the contract
was performed when the first dies, and that the survivor "shall
take an indefeasible estate in all the property of the first to die."
As is stated in the Wilson case, "The full and absolute power of
alienation is certainly repugnant to the notion that the survivor is
under a contractual obligation to keep his property intact and his
will unrevoked so that it will pass by virtue of the contract to the
heirs and distributees of the first to die."' 2 Thus, the survivor may
alienate the devised or bequeathed property at his volition, and
may, a fortiori, make a new will disposing of his property as he
sees fit.
Attention is now directed to the holding of the court in Turner
v. Theiss,"I the latest West Virginia case on mutual contractual wills.
"An agreement, duly established by proof and pursuant
to which mutual and reciprocal wills are executed, providing
for the testamentary disposition of the estates of the parties to
such agreement, will, upon the death of a party thereto, and
acceptance by the survivor of benefits under the will of the
party so dying, be specifically enforced, after the death of the
survivor, at the suit of beneficiaries under said mutual and
reciprocal wills.'
4
At first blush, this case appears wholly repugnant to prior de-
cisions. The earlier cases held the will of the survivor inoperative;
here the court affirms a decree for specific performance. It is then
necessary to compare the Turner case with the prior cases on
mutual contractual wills to determine the reason for the court's
apparent deviation. In each of the prior cases, the object of the
mutual contractual wills was to vest in the survivors the substantial
part or entire estate of the first to die; therefore once having at-
tained that object, the will of the survivor became inoperative.
However, the questions presented in the Turner case had no rela-
tion to lapsed devises or legacies. The makers, after devising and
bequeathing their respective estates to the survivor thereof, went
10 W. VA. CODE C. 41, art. 3, § 3 (Michie, 1949).
" 125 W. Va. 555, 26 S.E.2d 222 (1943).
12 116 W. Va. at 561, 182 S.E. at 542.
's 129 W. Va. 23, 38 S.E.2d 369 (1946).
14 Id., syl. 1.
6
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further and provided that the estate of the survivor should go to
certain named kinsmen of both. As previously stated, in the earlier
cases the effect given to the survivor's will was to declare it inopera-
tive due to the necessity of avoiding the results of the anti-lapse
statute. Here definite gifts-over were provided after the death of
the last survivor; therefore, the antilapse statute would have no
effect upon the result.
Thus the distinction: where the agreement to make mutual
contractual wills contains specific provisions for limitations over,
followed by the execution of the wills, the survivor's will not only
remains operative, but is held to the terms of the testamentary
agreement. Any attempt by the survivor to make an inconsistent
testamentary disposition will thereby be nullified.
It has been shown previously that in the Werkman case the
will of the surviving spouse was held to be operative. The same
result was reached by the court in the Turner case. Yet, in the
former case the parties protesting the probate of the will failed to
show that there was any contractual agreement existing between
the makers of the mutual wills; whereas, in the latter case, the
wills were found to be mutual contractual wills, and the survivor's
will was operative upon his death. This comparison is noted only
for the purpose of illustrating that if the wills are merely mutual
that obviously the validity of the wills has no effect upon each
other. Conversely, if the wills are mutual contractual wills, the
provisions of the separate wills have a significant effect upon each
other. This has been seen from the prior comparison of the will
in the Turner case with other wills in West Virginia which have
been found to be mutual contractual wills.
It is therefore submitted that the useless litigation created by
the execution of joint, mutual, and mutual contractual wills may
be avoided by proper draftsmanship. By confronting the makers
of the wills with the problems involved, any undesirable law can
be avoided and the testamentary intent of the parties may be
satisfied. By expressing the intent of the parties in explicit and
absolute terms, the drafting attorney will prevent possible attack
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